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A THEORETICAL REVIEW OF THE RELATIONSIDP BETWEEN 
STATE TAXES AND AGGREGATE LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION RATES, WITH AN EMPIRICAL TEST 
By 
John D. Groesbeck 
Southern Utah University 
L. Dwight Israelsen 
Utah State University 
A THEORETICAL REVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
STATE TAXES AND AGGREGATE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
RATES, WITH AN EMPIRICAL TEST 
Much research has been done to discover how taxes affect the 
labor decisions of ho~seholds, particularly with respect to 
market hours. The purpose of this paper is to create a 
theoretical link between market participation and market hours 
under an infinite set of household perceptions about the flow-
back of tax payments as public transfers. And finally, a link is 
made between the typical micro-level analysis of these choices to 
the aggregated data that are more readily available to policy 
makers. 
Initial theoretical works by Milton Friedman (1949, 1976) 
and the general equilibrium approach taken by Gwartney and Stroup 
(1983) show that when tax revenues flow back to the household in 
the form of transfers, there is only a compensated substitution 
effect. There is no income effect in this case because the tax 
J 
payment is added back into household income as a non-wage public 
transfer of income. 
Assuming for the moment that public sector spending is 
perceived by the average individual in the aggregate economy as a 
dollar-for-dollar offset to taxes paid, the change ir- work hours 
and labor force participation can be shown graphically. In the 
case of increasing linear taxes, the expected wage fa l ls from w 
to w' as non-wage income increases from Yn to Yn', which 
increases the reservation wage. The net result is that market 
hours fall from Tiw to Tiw '. Further, the probability of labor 
force participation in the aggregate falls due to converging 
expected and reservation wages (see Figure 1). This of course 
assumes that gross real wages and gross real asset income are 
held constant, and that the economy remains on a given production 
possibilities frontier. 
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FIGURE 1. NON-WAGE INCOME COMPENSATION FOR REDUCED 
WAGES IN THE PRESENCE OF TAXES 
o 
Other ' authors (Hausman and Ruud, 1984; Triest, 1990) have 
empirically analyzed the effect of taxes on the labor hours 
supplied by men and women. Hausman and Ruud found that the 
elasticity associated with net wages was .26 for men and .32 for 
women. These low elasticity values were verified by Triest who 
estimated uncompensated wage elasticities for men between -.02 
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and .06, and uncompensated elasticities for women between .03 
and .28, depending on the method used. 
These low wage elasticities are taken to suggest that as net 
wages fall due to increasing taxes, there must be an income 
effect which counters the dominating substitution effect 
hypothesized by Friedman and others. Blomquist (1988) suggests 
that the reason empirical researchers are deriving such low net 
wage elasticities is that they fail to account for the 
nonlinearity of the tax structure. Blomquist argues that 
nonlinear tax rates shift the supply curves of different income 
earning groups, and that the net result is an empirical 
estimation which is misleading and far less elastic than it 
should be. 
On the other hand, MaCurdy et ale (1990) argue that studies 
which account for nonlinear taxes using a piecewise budget set in 
a maximum likelihood model will typically generate larger 
substitution and lower income elasticities than with other 
methods. These authors suggest that this result is not due to 
theory but the implicit assumptions involved in using maximum 
likelihood methods (i.e., forcing Slutsky conditions and 
inequality restrictions on Slutsky terms) . 
In summary, reviewing the literature, which has a primary 
focus on market hours, does little to clarify the issue of how 
taxes affect the labor decisions of households. However, in all 
of these studies, the point of attack or defense is related to 
the relative size of the income and substitution effects 
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associated with the imposition of taxes on income, which is 
directly related to the extent to which tax payments flow back as 
transfers. 
Given the diverse empirical and theoretical examples listed 
above, it may be that the simultaneous existence of substitution 
and income effects, and/or work hours constraints, minimize the 
observable impact on market hours in the aggregate. A more 
fruitful line of research for empirically determining the impact 
of taxes on households may focus less on the market hours 
question and more on the participation decision. While this line 
of research will not logically lead to information about market 
hours and output fluctuations, it may lead to greater information 
about the impact on household welfare as individuals decide to 
participate in the market. 
Particularly in the presence of fixed hours constraints, the 
initial decision to enter the market is associated with far 
greater individual and social costs than is the decision to work 
an additional hour; and is, therefore, much more socially 
relevant. 
A. Theoretical Explanation of the Impact of Taxes 
on Labor Supply Decisions 
There is often a disharmony between changes in market hours 
and the participation decision. The purpose of this section is 
to show that this disharmony may exist with respect to changes in 
tax rates, in support of the notion that examining the impact of 
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taxes on participation rates versus market hours may lead one to 
opposite conclusions. 
The impact of taxes on participation rates and market hours 
can be generalized by maximizing a typical interdependent utility 
function. From this maximization process, a Slutsky 
decomposition of the influences on participation and market hours 
can be created. 
The ith individual in a household maximizes the utility 
function: 
where Ii is leisure time, C1 is the value of the individual's 
consumption, and U j is the utility of the jth person(s) in the 
household. Including the utility of the jth person forces 
interdependence of utility between family members. 
Leisure time within the utility function is simply defined 
as: 
where T is total time available, Tw is time spent in wage 
earning, and TiHP is time spent in individual non-wage household 
production of goods and services, noting that some of li and TiHP 
may be time spent jointly with other household members. 
Individual consumption, C1 , is composed of purchased goods 
and services, Xi' and the money value of goods and se~vices 
produced by the household, Zl . The value of C1 can be expressed 
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as: 
Ci=PXi+Zi (3) 
where P is the price of consumer goods and services. The value 
of Zi is assumed to be equal to the opportunity costs (disposable 
wages forgone) associated with the hours spent on household 
production, Zi= wi'T iHP ' where prime values indicate disposable 
wages and income. The value of household production of goods and 
services can be expressed as: 
Z=W~TiHP+wjTjHP (4) 
which implies that Z = Zi + Zj. 
A production constraint is imposed on (4) through the time 
identity in (2) which shows time to be a zero-sum commodity. A 
budget constraint is imposed on consumption of X i in that 
PXi =CP1 =Yd - (S+Cpj )' (5) 
where Yd is the disposable income of the household, S is 
household saving, and Cpj is purchased consumption by the jth 
person(s) . 
The time constraint is directly tied to a budget constraint 
Yd =( (TiwWi+TjwWj) +Ytr+Ya ) -Taxes (6) 
where disposable household income depends directly on the time 
allocated to market hours by the ith and jth persons, the 
respective wages of these persons (Wi and wj ), transfe:-s (Y t =) , 
asset income (Ya ), and taxes. Asset income in time period t can 
be expressed as 
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Ya =(Ya +S(t-l)-Ca )I(t)-TaxeS(t)I (7) (t) (t - 1) (t) 
where Ca is consumption of wealth, which can be assumed to be a 
function of unemployment, position in life-cycle, and duration of 
unemployment. The risk-free component of the interest rate (r) 
is typically determined by the Treasury when it issues short-term 
securities, and is therefore exogenous. The remainder of the 
interest rate is a function of the relative risk involved in the 
household asset portfolio. 
Optimal leisure, market, and household production time can 
be found by maximizing individual utility in equation (1), 
subject to budget and time constraints. A Slutsky decomposition 
is created below to show the hypothesized impact of changing 
monetary factors and competing time uses. 
The time and money constraints can be expressed in a single 
full-income equation as 
Where prime values are net of taxes, this implies that the 
expenditures on goods (the value of market time by the ith and 
jth persons) plus expenditures on leisure plus the value of 
household production are equal to the total value of time for the 
ith and jth persons, plus non-wage income. Therefore, the system 
of equations provided above implies that market, leisure, and 
household production hours are a function of wages and non-wage 
income, so that T~ = f(w i ', wj ', Yn'). The Slutsky is derived 
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directly as a total differential of this e xpression 
(9) 
which shows that the total change in market hours is composed of 
the own-wage compensated substitution effect plus the cross-wage 
compensated substitution effect, plus the full income effect 
(Keeley, 1981). It is important to understand at this point that 
wages of the jth person change the budget constraint of the ith 
person through non-wage income (private transfers) . 
The first partial derivative of Ti w with respect to Yn' is 
negative. It is assumed that the sign of the utility held 
constant (compensated) first partial derivative of Th; with 
respect to Wi' is positive. After-tax non-wage income, Yn', can 
now be defined as Ya' + Yt , or, net asset income plus transfers 
(public and private), which are assumed to be non-taxable. 
If it is assumed that households may not perceive the tax 
payments they make flowing back to them as transfers, then 
imposing an income tax that does not discriminate between wage 
and non-wage income reduces both non-wage income and wages. 
Under this assumption, altering the wage a l one implies both an 
income and substitution effect. The actual impact on hours 
worked due to the change in the net wage wi ll depend on the 
relative dominance of the income or substitution effect, assuming 
no offsetting increase in transfers. Changes in non-wage income 
alone will only cause an income effect. Therefore, t he net 
9 
impact on market hours due to a simple income tax depends on the 
relative strength of the substitution effect due to a change in 
wage rates, and the income effects due to changes in asset income 
and wages. 
The regions of substitution or income effect dominance of 
changing the wage rate alone can be shown graphically, by 
assuming a two-dimensional indifference mapping (Figure 2) 
between leisure time (li) and disposable income (Yd ) , where 
market time of the jth person is zero. It is assumed that a 
constant level of nonwage income (Y n ) will exist if no perceived 
transfers occur. 
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FIGURE 2. REGIONS OF DOMINANT INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION 
EFFECTS DUE TO CHANGING WAGE RATES 
Note that as the net wage is reduced from near-infinity, 
market hours rise to a positive maximum at T i w* and then begin to 
fall toward zero, where the expected net wage is equal to the 
reservation Jwage. Where wages are inversely related to work 
hours, the income effect is dominant over the income effect. 
Where wages are directly related to work hours, the substitution 
effect is dominant over the income effect. 
As stated earlier, changes in non-wage income wi l l only 
cause an income effect. Given this information, if a particular 
household faces a ten percent effective tax rate, the~ both Wi 
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and Ya are reduced by ten percent, causing both a downward 
rotation and downward shift of the budget constraint. 
Theoretical Extension to Aggregate Analysis. 
If it is assumed that the indifference set, asset income, 
and expected wage are for an average individual in a particular 
state, then it will be true that a distribution exists around the 
expected reservation wage, expected wage, and asset income. 
Given this, the probability of labor force participation can be 
expressed as 
( ) =f(wage)-g(a(Yn» (10) p LFP f() , wage 
p(LFP) >= 0, where f(wage) is the distribution of mean-normalized 
real wages and g(a(Yn )) is the distribution of mean-normalized 
reservation wages which are a function of non-wage income. As 
the distribution of asset income falls, the distribution of 
normalized reservation wages also falls. Therefore, if the 
distribution of wages falls more than the distribution of 
reservationJ wages, then the probability of labor force 
participation will fall as the distributions converge. It is 
important to note that it is the absolute change in the 
distribution of normalized wages and reservation wages, not the 
percentage change, which determines changes in the participation 
decision. A measure of absolute normalized change for any 
distribution of x is 
12 
(Xi (C=l) -X(C=O») • (11) ~(f(x))=--~~~~-
If the distribution of reservation wages falls more than the 
distribution of wages, then aggregate participation rates will 
rise as the distance between their respective mean values 
increase. Predicting whether market hours will rise or fall in 
these circumstances depends on whether the new after-tax wage is 
above or below the market-hours maximizing (optimal) net wage. 
If the new after-tax wage is above the optimal net wage, market 
hours will increase, or vice versa. 
Changing the mean value of after-tax non-wage income, 
ceteris paribus, traces out the distribution of expected after-
tax wages. Changing the mean value of expected after-tax wages, 
ceteris paribus, traces out the distribution of reservation 
wages, which are a function of after-tax non-wage income. 
Changing either non-wage income or wages under ceteris paribus 
conditions causes changes in the labor force participation rate 
in exactly opposite ways. Figure 3 below shows the change in the 
J 
aggregate labor force participation rate as a function of the 
change in the mean after-tax expected wage, assuming there is no 
overlap in either of the distributions at the origin. 
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FIGURE 3. CHANGE IN AGGREGATE LFPR AS A FUNCTION OF THE 
CHANGE IN MEAN AFTER - TAX EXPECTED WAGE 
Figure 4 below shows the change in the aggregate labor force 
participatlon rate as a function of the change in mean after-tax 
non-wage income, once again assuming there is no ove~lap between 
these distributions at the origin. 
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FIGURE 4. CHANGE IN AGGREGATE LFPR AS A FUNCTION OF 
CHANGE IN MEAN AFTER-TAX NON-WAGE INCOME 
From a policy standpoint, if an asset-income tax is imposed, 
market hours and participation rates will always rise, ceteris 
paribus. If a linear wage tax is imposed and after-tax wages are 
above the optimal wage, market hours will rise while 
participation rates fall. The same principle applies to non-
linear wage taxes, although the shape and placement o f the 
optimal market-hours offer curve will be different. ?or example, 
market hours will decrease faster above the optimal wage for a 
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progressive tax structure than a linear one as wages are 
increased. 
If wages and asset income are simultaneously taxed at the 
same rate, the effect on participation rates may be directly or 
inversely related to changes in market hours, depending on the 
after-tax values of non-wage income and the expected wage. If it 
is assumed that the majority of households within a particular 
state have high asset income and moderate wages, then imposing a 
linear tax which affects all income sources at the same rate will 
cause the distribution of wages to fall less than the 
distribution of reservation wages in absolute terms. Market 
hours, therefore, may fall while participation rates rise. 
However, if households which have high non-wage income are 
selectively taxed, where their expected after-tax wages are above 
the optimum wage, then it is likely that market hours will rise 
while participation rates may rise, fall or remain constant, 
depending on the absolute magnitude of changes in the expected 
wage and non-wage income. 
To summarize, the problem of predicting participation rates, 
and how those rates are correlated with work hours, breaks down 
to an analysis of the normalized absolute change in reservation 
wages and expected wages, and whether the after-tax expected wage 
was reduced in the region above or below the optimum wage. A 
high change in non-wage income and a low change in expected 
wages, for example, would be caused by applying a single tax rate 
against income that is composed mainly of non-wage i n 2ome, with 
16 
relatively low wage income. possible combinations of these 
variables and the predicted signs are summarized in Table 1 
below. 
Change 
Yn 
High 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Low 
Low 
TABLE I--THE EFFECT OF INCREASING A UNIFORM INCOME TAX ON 
MARKET HOURS AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, 
BY INCOME TYPE AND LEVEL l 
Hypothesized 
in: Position of Effect on: 
Wage After-Tax Wage Market Hours Participation 
High > w * + + -w or 
Low > w * + + w 
High > * + w w 
Low > * + + -w w or 
High < * + + w w or - or -
Low < * + + w w or -
High < w * w 
Low < * + + w w or - or -
1 Assuming Constant Indifference Set and Linear Taxes. 
(w* is the hours-optimizing wage) 
As shown above, there are only two cases when participation 
rates and hours worked are directly correlated (Low/High, w < w*; 
High/Low, w > w*), and one case where there is an inverse 
relationship (Low/High, w > w*) . 
The impact of a combined wage and asset income tax on market 
hours for a~ average individual can be shown using the three-
dimensional offer surface provided in Figure 5. This 
representation shows market hours provided due to all possible 
combinations of after-tax wages and non-wage income, with the 
restriction that disposable non-wage income must be greater than 
zero. 
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FIGURE 5. MARKET HOURS OFFER SURFACE 
Reservation 
Wage 
Moving from point A to point B causes a reduction in the 
after-tax wage and non-wage income, but increases the number of 
market hours. Further, it appears that the absolute reduction in 
non-wage income is greater than the absolute reduction in the 
wage; therefore, we may assume that participation rates will 
increase as well. 
The preceeding analysis confirms that labor force 
participation mayor may not be directly correlated with changes 
in market hours that occur due to changes in tax rates. This 
result can be provided as a partial explanation for why empirical 
18 
researchers have found little correlation between market hours 
and net wages. As some people reduce market hours due to 
increased taxes, others increase hours while still others leave 
6 
or enter the labor market; a decision associated with fixed hours 
constraints. 
B. Structural Model Development 
The preceding theoretical discussion showed that if tax 
payments do not completely flow back to households as perceived 
public transfers, multiple combinations of effects on 
participation rates and work hours are possible. As mentioned 
earlier, a simple test of whether representative households 
perceive that tax revenues are flowing back to them in the form 
of transfers is to examine variations in participation rates in 
the presence of different tax rates, controlling for changes in 
real income and other demographic variables. 
A basic model to explain labor force participation can be 
developed by acknowledging that the reservation wage is a 
function of average non-wage income, which can be simply defined 
) 
as the average transfer payment plus average asset income. 
Further, the expected wage for the representative individual is 
the average wage, conditioned by the probability of receiving 
that wage. The probability of receiving a given wage can be 
defined as one minus the unemployment rate. The discussion above 
assumes that the indifference set remains constant in shape and 
placement. 
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The structural model becomes 
LFPR=p(E(w) ,wr ), (12) 
E (w) = ( 1 - UN) w, ( 13 ) 
wr=r(Yt,Ya ). (14) 
Given that this model is for an average individual, there exists 
a distribution around both the reservation and expected wages. 
Therefore, as these mean values start to converge, we would 
expect to observe greater overlap in their respective 
distributions, thus causing observed aggregate participation 
rates to fall. 
As stated earlier, if one rejects the notion that only a 
compensated substitution effect exists, then predicting the 
change in participation rates due to taxes becomes somewhat more 
difficult. If the tax is structured in such a way that it 
reduces asset income more than wages, then participation rates 
may rise as taxes are imposed. Further, if the tax maintains the 
difference between the reservation wage and the expected wage, 
albeit at 19wer levels for both, then participation rates should 
remain constant. 
With this information, the realism of the assumpt ion that 
there is an exclusive compensated substitution effect can be 
tested, by testing whether a significant relationship exists 
between tax rates and participation rates. The null 
hypothesis in this case being that the coefficient associated 
with taxes is less than zero. 
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c. The Empirical Model 
Panel data for all fifty states over the period 1985 to 1990 
were used for this study. ~ The empirical model closely follows 
the structural model shown above, where the budget constraint is 
defined as the nominal wage (WAGEN), Average welfare payment per 
r ecipient household (AID), per capita social security payment 
(PCSS), the unemployment rate (UN); and the percentage of 
unemployed persons unemployed for fifteen weeks or more (DU). 
The DU variable is included as an assumed directly related proxy 
for variat i ons in the consumption of wealth, which reduces asset 
income. 
Given that nominal wages, unemployment rates, duration of 
unemployment, participation rates and transfer payments are 
simultaneously determined in the market, fitted values of right-
hand side endogenous variables (DU, WAGEN, UN, AID, PCSS) were 
first obtained by separate fixed-effect and random-e=fect models 
to avoid s i multaneity bias. The set of exogenous variables that 
were used t o obtain fitted values included eight dumny variables 
to represent the nine census regions. Including regional 
) 
identifiers modifies the assumption of statistical independence 
between the states, to create a more realistic assumption of 
regional i~terdependence . Additional instruments included the 
percentage of employment in the manufactur ing, service, and 
agricultural sectors; percentage of the population over 65; 
percentage of the state population with foc~-year degrees or 
more ; percentage of workers in the manufacturi ng seCL or who are 
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members of unions; dummy variable designating whethe ~ the state 
i s a right-to-work state; state population; percentage of 
population designated as black and hispanic; a set 0: five dummy 
variables for the six year period; and the percentage of the 
population who voted for the Republican Party in the 1986, 1988, 
and 1990 elections. 
The model that was used to generate the first-s_age fitted 
values was determined by applying the Hausman Specification Error 
test . Selection results are provided in Table 2 bel ow . 
TABLE 2--FIRST-STAGE EQUATION SELECTION RESULTS 
Hausman 
Equation Selected Chi-Square p-Value Ac~ . R2 
WAGEN (fixed effect) 73.55 .0000 .90 
UN (fixed effect) 92.93 .0000 .55 
DU (ran. effect) 35.06 .0513 .18 
PCSS (ran. effect) 12.09 .9689 .97 
AID (ran. effect) 19 . 74 . 6575 .52 
Effective tax rates were calculated from the tax burdens for 
a family of four with gross income of $25,000 for sa~es (STAX), 
property (PTAX) , and income taxes (YTAX), for the la~gest city in 
) 
each state. A composite of all of the above taxes, plus 
automobile licensing fees (TAX), was also tested. L:caloption 
sales taxes were not included in the rates to allow :or statewide 
comparison. Property tax burdens are difficult to extrapolate to 
a statewide comparison due to the fact that local government 
entities may each have a different property tax rate structure, 
and that property tax burdens are as much a functior. of property 
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values as tax rates . Therefore , caution should be csed when 
examining the impact due to property taxes. 
Each tax rate was included into the reduced form equation 
with the fitted endogenous variables individually in a separate 
run . The fixed-effects model, as opposed to the random-effects 
model, proved to be the appropriate specification ir. each case, 
as shown by the Hausman specification error test. The 
probability of error, given the chi-square distribut ion of the 
test, was always less than .0000. Further, an F-stat istic 
testing whether the intercepts for all states were equal showed 
that there was a significant difference between regular OLS 
estimates and the fixed effect estimates. The probanility of 
error for the test was less than .0001 in all cases. 
D. Results 
The coefficients associated with the effective ~ax rates 
were insignificant at the .05 level, with the except~on of the 
effective income tax. Estimated coefficients for al_ variables 
are shown i n Table 3 below. 
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TABLE 3--ECONOMETRIC RESULTS OF FIXED- EFFECTS MODELS 
PREDICTING LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES AS A FUNCmrON OF 
TAXES AND OTHER VARIABLES 
Model Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Dependent Variable: LFPR 
Income Tax WAGENH .000408 3.80 
(R2 = .35) UNH - .151 -1.25 
DUH .05 1.91 
AIDH - .0002 -1.63 
PCSSH - .298 -1.44 
YTAX - .292 -1.96 
Sales Tax WAGENH .00039 3.60 
(R2 = .34) UNH - . 11 - .93 
DUH .051 1.93 
AIDH - .00018 -1.47 
PCSSH - .00003 -1.33 
STAX .003 .21 
Property Tax WAGENH .0004 3.69 
(R2 = .35) UNH - .12 - .98 
DUH .05 1.93 
AIDH - .00016 -1.31 
PCSSH - .000031 -1.50 
PTAX .087 1.55 
Total Tax WAGENH .00039 3.62 
(R2=.34) UNH - .11 - .92 
DUH .05 1.92 
AIDH - .00018 -1.43 
PCSSH - .000029 -1.39 
TAX .029 .56 
E. Interpretation of Results 
The signs associated with each of the variables can be 
explained using some combinations of economic theory. The 
positive relationship between wages and labor force partic i pation 
rates implies that the expected wage is rising relat~ve to the 
reservation wage, which would then increase the part~cipat ~on 
rate. 
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As d iscussed e a r lier , i ncr eas ing unemploymen t rate s decrease 
the expected wage t oward t he reservation wage, and t hu s the 
negative s i gn. Further, t he l onge r t he du r a t ion o f unemp l oyment 
observed in a state, the lower the wealth balance, a nd the higher 
will be the participation rate. This result provides evidence in 
favor of the "added worker" e f fect hypothesized by Lundberg 
(1985) and others. As expected, the larger the value of transfer 
payments (AID, PCSS) the less will be the participat i on rate as 
non-wage income rises. 
As indicated, the coefficient associated with t he income tax 
is significant in the negative direction. This implies that the 
substitution effect of the tax is greater than its income effect. 
A number of things can be inferred from the insignif ~ cance of the 
rest of the tax coefficients, including the rejectio~ of the null 
hypothesis of this paper, that higher taxes are always correlated 
with a lower participation rate, after controlling for variations 
in monetary income. From the results presented above, it can be 
inferred that people do not fully perceive the public benefits 
provided at the state level, where public benefits a~e more 
visible as Jopposed to federal benefits, as transfer ~ncome. 
Quite the contrary, the signs of the tax coefficients for sales, 
property and total taxes, while insignificant, are p ositive 
rather than negative. 
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F. Conclusions 
If all tax revenues are used to create government goods and 
services, but these goods and services are not~ all perceived by 
individuals as transfer income, the impact of taxes on market 
hours and participation rates becomes a function of income and 
substitution effects associated with changing expected wages, and 
income effects associated with changing asset income. This study 
does not necessarily support the notion that only a compensated 
substitution effect exists due to all forms of taxation. Rather, 
this research tends to support the research of Hausman and Ruud 
(1984) and Triest (1990), who found little or no connection 
between tax rates and labor supply. However, with respect to the 
income tax, there appears to be at least some compensating 
effect. 
This research also provides moderate support for an added-
worker effect, which may cause higher levels of participation due 
to target income earning preferences of households. This higher 
level of participation is associated with changes in the level of 
domestic service within households, and, assuming that market 
) 
hours are inelastic with respect to net wages, a red~ction in 
individual and household utility, and therefore social welfare 
during long periods of unemployment. 
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Appendi x 
All data related to wages, labor force part ic i pation, and 
employment by sector were collected from Employment and Wages: 
Annual Averages or Geographic Profile of Employment and 
Unemployment published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Tax 
data were collected from the District of Columbia which completes 
a yearly cross-sectional study of effective tax rates in a 
publication called Tax Rates and Tax Burdens in the Di str i ct of 
Columbia : A Nationwide Comparison . Data for all remaining 
variables were collected from the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States. 
Eight dummy variables were created to represent nine regions 
in the first stage estimation of median household income and 
unemployment. These regions are defined as: 
Region 
New England 
(REGl) 
Middle Atlantic 
(REG2 ) 
East North Cent. 
(REG3 ) 
State 
Maine 
New Hampshire 
Vermont 
Massachusetts 
Rhode Island 
Connecticut 
New York 
New Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
Ohio 
Indiana 
Illinois 
Michigan 
Wisconsin 
27 
West North Cent. 
(REG4 ) 
South Atlantic 
(REGS) 
East So. Cent. 
(REG6) 
West So. Cent. 
(REG7 ) 
Mountain 
(REG8 ) 
Pacific 
Minnesota 
Iowa 
Missouri 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
Nebraska 
Kansas 
Delaware 
Maryland 
Virginia 
W. Virginia 
N. Carolina 
S. Carolina 
Georgia 
Florida 
Kentucky 
Tennessee 
Alabama 
Mississippi 
Arkansas 
Louisiana 
Oklahoma 
Texas 
Montana 
Idaho 
Wyoming 
Colorado 
New Mexico 
Arizona 
Utah 
Nevada 
Washington 
Oregon 
California 
Alaska 
Hawaii 
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